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Being on Sick Leave – Possible Explanations for 
Differences of Sick-leave Days Across Countries 
Abstract 
 
Sick-leave days differ widely among industrialised countries. For the US it is 5, for Swe-
den 20 and for Poland 26 days per year and per employee. The possible causes for these 
differences have apparently not been systematically analysed. Two groups of contributing 
factors are considered: (1) natural causes, like the general health situation, employment of 
women and older persons, and (2) behavioural reactions (a) to macroeconomic conditions, 
like unemployment or the possibility to work outside the official labour market, and (b) to 
the design of institutions, like the generosity of granting sick leave. On the basis of 20 
countries it is econometrically shown that the main explanatory factors are: generosity of 
granting sick leave, opportunity costs due to income differentials with neighbouring 
states, and employment of older people. The unemployment rate – contrary to the result of 
some single-country studies – and the employment of women do not contribute to the 
explanation of sick-leave differences between countries.  
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1. Introduction 
There are large differences in sickness absence across industrialised countries (see figure 1). 
The differences between the country with the lowest level of days absent due to illness (USA) 
and the one with the highest level (Poland) are more than fivefold. It is also striking that the 
Eastern European transition countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovak Republic and Poland) 
are all among the countries with the highest number of days absent, with Poland, Slovak Repub-
lic and the Czech Republic ranked on top. This article seeks to explain these differences.  
 
Figure 1: 






























Section 2 describes what the literature has to say to that question and what it does not say.  An-
nex A contains an annotated list of the literature. The next section discusses possible explana-
tory variables in the light of the literature and adds two variables which apparently have not 
been taken into account up to now. Section 4 contains the econometric analysis. The data is 
described, the method introduced and the results presented. Sections 5 and 6, respectively, offer 
a conclusion on economic policy reform and some ideas for further research. 
 
 
2. The literature and open questions 
There is a growing literature on sickness absence. It can be classified into country studies, inter-
national comparisons and single topic studies. Annex Table A.1 gives an overview. Most stud-
ies (at least most of the studies listed) are by economists, but also sociologists and psychologists 
are engaged in the debate. All studies, with one exception, are of an empirical nature, albeit 
using methods of quite different degrees of sophistication. The exception is the study of Holm-
lund (2004), who presents a theoretical model of employee behaviour under specific benefit   2
schemes applied to different labour force states (like at work, on sick-leave, unemployed). The 
majority of studies focuses on single countries, sometimes with a look to other countries.  
 
Compared to single country studies, there is a much lower number of international comparisons. 
An even smaller number covers many countries and tries to assess the determinants of differ-
ences in sickness absence. One recent example for the latter type of studies is the yet unpub-
lished work of Frick and Malo (2005). 
 
However, the existing literature mentions a certain number of possible determinants of sick-
leave differences across countries. These determinants will be incorporated into this analysis. At 
first one might consider the objectively given health situation of the population as a determining 
effect on sickness absence. But there seems to be no study in which this is suggested to be the 
case. (This could be different if countries of largely diverging per-capita income and health-care 
provision levels were analysed. But all studies mentioned in Table A.1 relate to industrial coun-
tries.) In many studies the determining effect of the unemployment rate (specifically: of its 
change) has been established. The employment of women and older persons also seems to con-
tribute to sickness absence. Many studies stress the importance of institutional regulations 
which determine the degree of generosity to which sick-leave absence is granted or made possi-
ble. But there is no study, to our knowledge, which establishes systematically a relation between 
a measure of generosity to the amount of sickness absence in a country-comparative context, 
with the exception of a preliminary study by Osterkamp (2002). 
 
One possible (co-)determining factor for sickness absence, which especially relates to the high 
number of days absent in the transition countries, is, to our knowledge, never mentioned in the 
literature: the opportunity for employees in lower income countries to earn income in the unof-
ficial labour market of neighbour states. Some studies on the determinants of sickness absence 
do make (verbal) reference to opportunity cost considerations and respective behavioural reac-
tions of employees but do not consider explicitly the question whether the opportunity to earn 




3. Explaining variables 
The aim is to explain the differences of sickness absence across countries. The potential ex-
plaining variables are taken from the above-mentioned literature and from further own consid-
erations. The variables can be grouped in natural causes and behavioural reactions. 
 
Natural causes 
Differences in the general health condition of the population might, at a first glance, be able to 
explain different sickness absence rates. However, it is not very plausible that the general health 
conditions in industrialised countries vary so much that the large differences in sickness absence   3
rates could be explained. Moreover, the “objectively given general health of a population” is 
difficult, if not impossible, to measure. Single variable measures, like mortality rates, do not 
seem to cover adequately what is meant by “general health of a population”. There do exist 
individual, self-reported judgements of own health in cross-country studies (e.g. Banks et al., 
2004). But the results are difficult to assess. It has been found that more than half of the differ-
ences in the self-reports are based on response scale differences (Banks et al., 2004). Thus, this 
factor has not been included in the list of potential explaining variables. 
 
Research at the enterprise level (e.g. Moreau et al., 2004, Barmby et al., 2000) shows that in 
most cases women and older persons are more often absent due to sickness than men or younger 
persons (by about 10% in both cases). Female and old-age participation rates have therefore 
been incorporated in the study.  
 
Behavioural reactions 
The unemployment rate and its change is the most intensively studied single factor for explain-
ing different (and changing) absence rates. In most countries there is a clear pro-cyclical behav-
iour of sickness absence. This relation is specifically pronounced e.g. in Germany, Norway and 
Sweden. For Norway, Askildsen et al. (2002) have shown that the pro-cyclical behaviour of 
sickness absence cannot be explained by a composition effect (changing age and health struc-
ture of an enterprise’s employees during the cycle) but must be due to a disciplining effect of 
the cycle. The level of unemployment, thus, has been included in the research.  
 
A further behavioural reaction can be expected to stem from institutional regulations concern-
ing sick leave, which can be characterised by the following factors:  
•  Is there a waiting period (and of how many days), after which sick-leave pay starts? 
•  Is there the possibility of self-certification for being sick (and for how many days)? 
•  The official sickness certificate is issued by whom – by the patient’s own doctor or by an 
independent examining doctor who works on behalf of the employer or the sickness fund? 
•  In case of sickness absence, how long does the employer continue to pay the salary, and is 
there any reduction? 
•  In case of sickness absence, how long does the sickness fund continue to pay the salary, and 
is there any reduction? 
 
These factors are condensed into a measure of generosity of granting sick leave. For the first 
three factors it is straightforward to integrate them into the measure of generosity. A longer 
waiting period reduces generosity, more self-certification days increase it. The issuance of the   4
official sickness certificate by a doctor of the patient’s confidence is of high generosity,
1 while 
the issuance by a doctor of the employer’s or the sickness fund’s confidence is of lower generos-
ity. The latter two cases mean that there is an external proof. Also straightforward is the amount 
(percentage) of continuation of payment, either by the employer or by the sickness fund. The 
higher the amount, the higher generosity. With respect to the question of who pays – the em-
ployer or the sickness fund – we assume that the longer the employer pays and the later the 
sickness fund steps in, the lower the generosity. The reason is that the employer–employee rela-
tion is less distant and more personal than the relation between sickness fund and employee. 
Moreover, the sickness fund draws on anonymous funds, while the employer uses his own 
money for paying sick leave. Thus, the latter has better instruments and more incentives to 
monitor the employee going or being on sick-leave. 
 
If a sickness is not too serious – all the more if there is no sickness at all – an employee has an 
advantage from being on sick leave. He (she) avoids the disutility of work, can perform simple 
tasks at home or can even offer working hours on the black labour market, while, at the same 
time,  sick-leave pay is received. The major enabling factor for this behaviour is the practice 
and generosity of granting sick-leave (see above under institutional factors). The driving factor 
of such behaviour is the size of the opportunity income (of various forms) that can be earned 
this way.  
 
In this study only one form of opportunity income is taken into consideration, namely the in-
come that can be earned from engaging in the labour market of a neighbour country. For coun-
tries of low per-capita income and with access to the labour market of high-income countries 
the size of that opportunity income and, thus, of the incentive to be engaged in black labour 
activities of the neighbour country is measured by the difference in per-capita income. For Hun-
gary, Poland, Portugal, the Czech Republic and Slovakia the incentive is, thus, measured as the 
percentage that the neighbouring country’s.
2  per capita income exceeds its own income.  
  
 
4. Econometric Analysis 
4.1 Data  
Data on sick leave absence for several countries are provided by the OECD (Health Database) 
and the WHO (Health for all Database). Sickness absence is measured on an annual basis by the 
                                            
1 Privately practicing doctors compete for patients. Issuance of sickness certificates is one of their impor-
tant instruments to meet the competition. To our knowledge, there is only one systematic survey that 
assesses the behaviour of doctors in issuing sickness certificates (Hussey et al., 2004, for general prac-
titioners in Scotland). The study reports that most doctors are neither willing nor do they feel able to 
differentiate between really sick patients and malingerers. The study concludes that there “appeared to 
be important deliberate misuse of the system by general practitioners” – and by patients, could be 
added. 
2 Austria and Germany are considered as neighbouring countries for Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia 
and Hungary. For Portugal the “neighbouring” high-income country has been assumed to be France.    5
number of work days lost per year and per employee. In order to reduce possible influences 
from the cycle, sickness absence figures have been calculated as the average of the years 1996-
2002. There exist contradictions between data published by official country sources and OECD 
and WHO data. These are possibly due to different methods of measurement.  While it is cer-
tainly preferable to use national sources in single country studies, we prefer data from interna-
tional organizations to assure comparability across countries. 
The data on female employment is calculated as percentage of female employed to total em-
ployed. Old age employment is measured as the percentage of 55-64 year old employed to total 
number employed. Figures on female employment, old age employment, the standardized un-
employment rate and per capita income are all taken from the OECD Statistical Compendium 
(2004). Information on the institutional factors has been gathered from several sources. The 
main source was the database Social Security throughout the World (2004) and the database 
Reformmonitor (2004) of the German Bertelsmann Foundation.  
 
4.2 Estimation Approach 
Because of the small number of observation
3 it is crucial in our analysis to save on the number 
of degrees of freedom to be able to make interferences. Thus, we aggregate the various meas-
ures of generosity to form a single index. To construct the index of generosity we have formed 
indices of the single factors, which are normalised to lie within a range of 0 and 1.
4 Each single 
index is coded in such a way that the higher the value of the subindex the higher the level of 
generosity according to our reasoning in the previous section. The aggregate index of generosity 
is then an unweighted average of the single indices. 
 
Instead of assigning identical weights to the single components of our index we alternatively use 
a factor analytical aproach to establish weights of the single factors. The basic idea is that the 
statistical relationship among indicators (measured by the correlation matrix) can be explained 
by their common dependency on one or a few common factors. Goal of factor analysis is to 
organize subindices or clusters in a way – not a priori, but on the basis of the information con-
tained in the data -   that the indicators within a subindex are more similar than the indicators in 
another subindex. The similarities of the subindices are computed from the information con-
tained in the indicators. To calculate the subindices factor analytical methods try to reveal ap-
proximate linear dependencies among indicators. This procedure assures that the smallest num-
ber of linear combinations (indicators) is constructed out of a set of subindices with the least 
loss of information. It is often the case that a small number of linear combinations provide the 
same amount of information for plots, regressions or cluster analysis as the original data.  
                                            
3 In most of the regression specifications the number of observation is 20. The countries included are 
Australia, Austria, Belgium Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Luxem-
bourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United 
Kingdom and the United States. 
4 The calculation of the indices has been done according to the following formula: (Observed value – Min 
(all values)) / (Max (all values) – Min (all values))   6
Work in progress. More to come… 
 
To investigate the differences in the number of sick leave days we employ a simple cross-
country OLS estimation approach. The main focus of our analysis lies in the institutional deter-
minants of granting sick leave days across countries. These institutional determinants usually 
stay constant over longer periods of time. Thus, the explanatory power of institutions to explain 
variations in sick-leave days is likely to stem from variations across countries and not within 
countries. This might explain why single-country studies that take into account institutions do 
not find clear cut evidence of a connection. 
 
More formally we estimate the following equation: 
 
(1)    yi = α + β Ii + γXi + εi   , 
 
where yi is the average number of sick leave days per employee and year, Ii is our index of gen-
erosity and Xi is vector of control variables that have been found  to explain sick leave days in 
the literature. Additionally we include in this set of control variables a measure of income dif-
ferences between neighbouring countries. Finally, εi is an error term with the usual properties 
exept that we allow the variance to vary across observations by using White’s heteroskedastic 
consistent standard errors in all our specifications.  
 
4.2 Results 
Table 1 (Annex C) provides first evidence of a positive relationship between the generosity of 
granting sick leave days and the average number of sick leave days. The table displays regres-
sion results of different specification of the generosity index and sick leave days. In all specifi-
cations the index is highly significant. It should be highlighted that when the employer’s dura-
tion of payment is included in the index the coefficient increases and the standard error re-
duces.
5  This supports our notion that there is a negative relationship between the duration of the 
employer’s payment and the level of sick leave days. In all regressions below we use the speci-
fication in which all single indicators are included (generosity index 1). This is our prefered 
specification as it is able to explain the highest share of the variation in sick leave days.  
 
To further explore if there indeed is a positive relationship between institutions that determine 
the level of generosity and the number of sick leave days or wether the index simply picks up 
the effect of omitted variables we control for a number of different explanatory variables pro-
posed in the literature. The results are shown in table 2. 
 
                                            
5  The  index of employer`s duration of payment is coded such that the higher the the level of the index 
the higher generosity.   7
First we control for the level of unemployment.  A high unemployment rate might discipline 
employees by inducing pressure of loosing their jobs. Table 2 column 1 shows that while the 
index of generosity stays highly significant the unemployment rate also exhibits a significant 
impact. However, the coefficient is positive. This result is counterintuitive and needs further 
investigation. Column 2 displays the results when a measure of employment protection is added 
to the regression.
6 Stricter employment protection might act as a counter force to unemployment 
rates, as it reduces the danger of job loss. Since employment protection and unemployment are 
likely to be positively correlated the coefficient of the unemployment rate might be biased up-
wards. While the coefficient of the generosity index only reduces marginally and stays highly 
significant the coefficient of the unemployment rate decreases by more than 10% and is now 
only significant at the 10% level. Employment protection is marginally significant (15% level) 
and has the expected sign. We take this result as evidence that the positive effect of the unem-
ployment rate on sick leave days can at least partially be explained by differences in labour 
market institutions.  
 
Inspection of figure 1 reveals that the Eastern European countries rank on top in the level of sick 
leave days in the sample. To control for the effect of Eastern European countries we include a 
dummy variable (column 3). The results are striking. The coefficient of the dummy variable is 
highly significant. Moreover, the coefficient of the the unemployment rate decreases by more 
than 50% and is no longer significant. The coefficient on strictness of employment protection 
also declines but is now significant at the 10% level. Our measure of generosity is still highly 
significant. The initial counterintuitive effect of the unemployment rate can therefore entirely be 
traced back to the influence of the transition countries. 
 
This last result raises the question as to what the underlying causes for the exceptional high 
absence days in Eastern European countries might be.  We propose as one possible explanation 
per capita income differences between neighbour states. Income differentials can be interpreted 
as opportunity costs and thus provide an incentive to call in sick and offer labour in the informal 
sector of the neighbour state. To test this hypothesis we include income differentials into our 
regression specification. The results in column 4 show that income differentials have significant 
explanatory power (only slightly above the 5% level). Furthermore, differences in per capita 
income seem to reflect more information than simply picking up the effect of the transition 
countries, as the dummy variable turns insignificant. Employment protection looses its signifi-
cance as well.
7   
 
                                            
6 We use the OECD index of employment protection legislation of regular contracts. The index is coded 
on a scale from 1 to 6, where a higher index value reflects stricter employment protection. The number 
of observations decreases to 19 since there is no observation for Luxemburg fort his index. 
7 We experimented with different and more general measures of labour market regulations, e.g. a measure 
provided by the Fraser Institute, but they all turn out to be insignificant.   8
Finally, we control for two more explanatory variables that are regularly proposed in the litera-
ture: employment of women and employment of the old. While we do not find an impact of 
female employment (column 5) on sick –leave days we do find a significant effect of the em-
ployment of the old (column 6).  
 
In table 3 we report next to our preferred specification (column1) results were we add women 
employment and strictness of employment protection separately and then jointly. As expected 
the results do not change significantly.  
 
As a very preliminary robustness check we employ a factor analytic method of aggregating in-
stitutional variables into our measure of generosity.
8 The advantage of this more sophisticated 
data reduction technique is that the weights of the single variables are no longer arbitrarily cho-
sen to be equal. Column 5 of table 3 displays the result. While this changes the results quantita-
tively – the coefficient on the index drops by more than a third – qualitatively the results stay 
the same – the generosity index is still highly significant. We take this as a hint that while equal 
weights might not be an appropriate way of aggregation the conclusion we drew are still valid.   
Work in progress.  More to come… 




The national discussion in many countries on how to reduce sickness absence seems to be de-
termined by the idea that work makes you sick. Accordingly, the linchpin of redressing exces-
sive absenteeism (as far as this is the case) is seen in requiring changes of the working condi-
tions, above all less repetitive work and more moral and social encouragement of the employ-
ees.    
 
Our analysis suggests that there are other factors that policymakers should take into account. In 
a sample of 20 OECD countries we find a strong positive relationship between the generosity of 
granting sick leave days and days of absenteeism. Furthermore, our results suggest that there is 
a positive relationship between income differences of neighbouring states and sick leave days. 
We interpret this as evidence that employees of lower income countries in the OECD have an 
incentive to report in sick on their regular job and instead work in the unofficial market of the 
high income neighbour state. In light of the demographic trend of ageing societies in many 
OECD countries it is noteworthy that we find a significant correlation between the number of 
older people employed and the number of sick leave days. However, the unemployment rate and 
                                            
8 We apply a principal factor analysis on our seven indicators of generosity. We extract only the first 
principal factor since it is the only one having an eigenvalue greater than 1. This factor corresponds to 
our index of generosity above. To obtain the weights of the single indicators we estimate the latent 
factor via the regression method (Thomson, 1951). The regression coefficients are than used as the 
weights.    9
the employment share of women do not contribute to the explanation of cross country differ-
ences in sickness absence.    
 
 
7. Further research 
First, a factor analytical approach to obtain weights of the index of generosity is preferable, 
since it overcomes the problem of arbitrarily chosen weights. 
 
Second, it would be desirable to scrutinise the sick-leave data as well as the factors of generos-
ity on the basis of a detailed country-by-country survey. A review of individual country sources 
might also lead to an enlargement of the number of countries incorporated in the analysis. 
 
Third, panel analysis might shed additional light on the question treated here. In particular, one 
could control for unobserved heterogeneity, which might be present in this context. However, 
that requires that information on generosity factors is available in time series.    10
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Annex A: Review of the literature and raw data 
 
Table A. 1 
















Strong increase of sick leave days (SLD) was accompanied by 
growing unemployment in 1980s (i.e.: anti-cyclical development). 
The increase of SLD is explained by higher use of sick-leave pay-
ment instead of (less attractive) unemployment compensation.  








The generosity of granting sick leave plays a dominant role in 
explaining the level and development of SLD. Moreover, SLD 
behave pro-cyclically. There is a short look also at the sick- leave 





Fehlzeiten: Welche Rolle 
spielt die Arbeitslosig-
keit?  (Determinants of 
sickness absence: which 
role for unemployment?) 
Ger-
many 
Main determinant of SLD is unemployment (and, thus, the cycle). 
SLD develop pro-cyclically. Changes of generosity have had minor 





Sick but yet at work. An 




“Presenteeism” means not being on sick leave although sick. The 
study is based on self-reported data. It finds that presenteeism is 
combined with working in care, welfare or teaching occupations, 




Disability Expenditures in 
Canada, 1970 – 1996: 
Trends, Reform Efforts 
and a Path for the Future 
Canada  Description of the various relevant social support systems for dis-
ability (sickness included), of expenditure trends and of ongoing 
reforms. Further necessary reforms are seen in a better program 
coordination and benefit integration. 
Ercolani, 2000, 
(sociologist)  
A Simple Empirical 
Model of Sickness Ab-
sence Appkied to UK 
Survey Data 
UK  An “Underlying Propensity for Sickness Absence” is measured by 
individual socio-economic characteristics.   
Askildsen, 
Bratberg and 
Nilsen, 2002,  
(economists) 
Unemployment, Labour 
Force Composition and 
Sickness Absence: A 
Panel Data Study  
Nor-
way 
There is a pro-cyclical development of sickness absence which can 
be explained by effects of the cycle on workers’ discipline, but not 





of Sickness Benefits in 
Sweden, 1981 – 1991 
Swe-
den 
Part of the high Swedish SLD figures is explained by the relatively 
intensive use of the sick-leave possibility by immigrants. 
Biffl, 2002 
(economist) 
Der Krankenstand als 
wichtiger Arbeitsmarkt-
indikator (Sick leave as 
Austria  Main determinants of SLD are seen to be the development of un-
employment (i.e.: SLD behave pro-cyclically) and of labour force 
participation rates (gender and age). The latter factor is influenced   13
an important indicator for 
the labour market)  





Analyse af det danske 
sygefravaer (Analysis of 
Danish sickness absence) 
Den-
mark 
SLD are mainly attributed to institutional conditions (generosity of 
granting sick leave). Short comparisons of those conditions with 




Disability Management – 
Statement and Comments 
NL and 
UK 
The contribution reviews critically the ongoing reform develop-
ments in the Netherlands to increase the responsibility of employ-
ers for reducing sickness absence (disability management prac-
tices) and the possible transfer of this method to the UK.  




system in the United 
Kingdom: qualitative 
study of views of general 
practitioners in Scotland 
UK  The study concludes that sick-leave certificates are issued to an 
important degree in deliberate misuse of the system.  





Occupational stress and 
incidence of sick leave in 
the Belgian workforce: 
the Belstress study 
Bel-
gium 
Study on the enterprise level. Sickness absence is mainly attributed 
to strained jobs with low social support. 
Single topic studies 
Beatty, Fother-
gill and Mac-
Millan,  2000, 
(economists, 
geographers) 
A Theory of Employ-







The study concludes that job dismissals may result in higher re-
corded sickness (absence) instead of higher recorded unemploy-
ment.  
Ichino and 
Riphahn,  2001, 
(economists) 
The Effect of Employ-
ment Protection on 
Worker Effort: A Com-
parison of Absenteeism 








The study shows that after the end of the probation period (begin-










Different labour force states are considered (employed, on sick-
leave, unemployed with or without searching due to health condi-
tions). It is assumed that the benefit structure applied for the differ-
ent states influences the choice of the state. It is shown that there 
might be a socially optimal benefit structure with differentiated 













Differences in institutional regulations (generosity of granting sick 
leave) across countries are described but are not seen as explana-
tory factors for differences in SLD. The main part of the study 
relates to the enterprise level, presents “models of good practice” 
(from 8 countries) and formulates 9 recommendations for enter-












Sickness absence is related to individual socio-economic factors 
(age, gender, marital status, income, sector, tenure). Moral hazard 




Work Lost Due to Illness 





Sickness absence is related to a rough indicator of generosity of 
granting sick leave. To the usual measure of total health-care costs 
of the economy the non-production due to sickness absence is 
added. 




Sygefravaer I Norden 





Sickness absence is mainly seen as a result of individual health and 
of the type of work and conditions of the work place. 
Eurostat, 2004  Work and Health in the 
EU – A Statistical Portrait 
EU 
total  
The publication provides commented tables and graphs. Sickness 
absence is only reported by sector, not by country. 









The amount of self-reported work disability differs considerably 
across countries. The study shows that more than half of that dif-
ference can be explained by response scale differences instead of 
by differences of the objectively given health status. 




Distribution of sickness 





Self-reported data for sickness absence of at least one day are used. 
Institutional regulations as possible explaining factors for differ-
ences across countries are mentioned. 




tions and individual ab-




Data from the “European Survey on Working Conditions”; explain-
ing variables as employment protection and sickness benefits are 
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